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Abstract: 
Road network is employed for exchanging the information among the vehicles where accidents and traffic 
information can be delivered, or receive services by an infrastructure. Although wireless communication 
systems yield an efficient traffic system and provide ease to the drivers, there is a chance of a traffic disturbance 
and risk to drivers through malicious information. So, there should be examined a way to limit the chance of an 
intermediate attack. This paper presents an efficient user based authentication protocol for location based 
services to secure address configuration for IPv6-based mix-zones over the road network. This protocol 
authenticates to inspect vehicles actions confidentially and have the following characteristics (1) Anonymous 
authentication: a message issuer can be authenticated. (2) Privacy: Communication content is confidential. The 
cost must be reduced through the address configuration scheme to improve the scalability. (3) Efficiency:  it 
attains quick message verification, low storage requirements, and in case of a dispute, provides cost efficient 
identity tracking. Vehicles movement, the variation of velocity and distance are considered to maintain as many 
common users as possible by reducing the cost. The performance evaluation and cost analysis show that our 
framework can reduce the cost and gain outperformed results. This model can achieve reliability and efficiency 
with packet rate information. This user authenticated key establishment protocol has comparatively shorter time 
response, diminishes cost, less packet loss information and enhanced privacy preservation against malicious 
attacks compared with existing methods. 
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1. Introduction 
The rapid development of vehicular technologies 
may apply new information and interconnection to 
improve the safety via vehicle to vehicle (V2V) and 
vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) communications [1]. 
Vehicular networks are also called Vehicular Ad Hoc 
Networks (VANETs), which are mostly used in 
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) applications. 
In vehicular networks, the vehicles communicate with 
each other such as Inter-Vehicle Communication (IVC) 
and also with roadside base stations through a 
roadside unit. The vehicular networks provide safety 
for the users on the roads by providing timely 
information to the drivers. The vehicular network is a 
sub-class of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) and 
works on the same principle of mobile ad hoc 
networks (MANETs). In the early stage of 2000, 
MANET were one to one application but now a days 
VANETs have grown up in terms of inter-vehicle 
communication. VANET supports wide range of 
applications such as multi-hop message broadcasting 
over long distance and many other technologies that 
might uses UMTS, LTE, or WiMAX IEEE 802.16. 
For short range communication, it may use WLAN 
(either standard Wi-Fi), Bluetooth, Visible Light 
Communication and Infrared. Routing protocols in 
VANETs are significantly different from road 
networks, because various applications in VANET 
may have different QOS requirements for safe 
application. Broadcast routing in VANET is unlike 
from routing in road network due to various reasons 
such as rapidly changing network topology, wide 
range communication, and traffic pattern in different 
time and places. This may imply that conventional 
routing protocols for road network are not appropriate 
for most vehicular broadcast applications and they 
may also have different application requirements as 
compared to road network such as Infotainment 
applications, assistance co-operative awareness and 
Traffic efficiency management. 
 In VANETs each message need not to be verified 
and sent to the main server while on the other hand, in 
road networks every message must have to pass from 
main server and road side unit. These periodically 
broadcast messages are known as beacon messages. 
The content of beacon messages may include a 
vehicle's current position, velocity, and headway route. 
All the beacon messages have common requirements 
which are periodic broadcast and low latency. The 
beacon messages are useful for safety applications, for 
instance driver assistance, collision avoidance, and 
cruise control, etc. These applications require timely 
and correct information, and the typical beacon 
broadcast frequency, that might be in the range of 5-
10 Hz [2]. The National Highway Trace Safety 
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Administration (NHTSA) has identified and set down 
requirements for Intelligent Vehicle Safety 
Applications [3]. Also, the work that would require 
V2V devices in latest vehicles in future has already 
been started on a regulatory proposal. In contrast, in 
V2I architecture the mobile vehicles directly connect 
with infrastructures set up along roads for sending and 
disseminating packets [4]. 
In Mix-zone server, two classical address 
configuration protocols such as stateful protocol [5] 
and other is stateless protocol established on duplicate 
address detection [6-10]. To consider latency and high 
cost, such protocols could not   efficiently work in 
multi-hops network and road network environment. 
To reduce the delay and cost and to achieve address 
configuration in the road networks is an important 
challenge. Various messages for road conditions, 
congestion avoidance and detour notification for road 
authorization can spread by VANETs [11-17]. The 
value-added services and traffic associated message 
delivered by road network are used to improve 
drivers’ wayfaring capability, toll payment services 
and provide internet access navigation etc. To address 
above challenges, this manuscript has proposed an 
effective protocol and anonymous authentication 
scheme for road network. Our scheme has significant 
feature that may compared with existing methods; (i) 
An anonymous authentication, it provides content 
secrecy communication (ii) It accomplishes low 
storage requirements. 
Following are our main contributions in this work: 
(1) We proposed location based routing protocol 
in road network to send data rapidly from the source 
vehicle to destination vehicle. A road network is an 
esteemed number of network gaps such as shortest 
paths, the average speed of the vehicles and the 
expected delay to transmit the data from one junction 
to another. 
(2) We establish a privacy preserving 
authentication protocol to verify the vehicle activities 
in a privacy preserving manner. We proposed a new 
method to adjust the vehicles speed which reduces the 
vehicle delay that might suffer from the network gap 
problem. 
(3) We proposed a novel vehicle orientated 
privacy preserving technique for road network 
services that is also proficient of protecting the Road 
side unit from attacks. 
(4) Vehicles moving trend, distance difference 
and velocity difference, are considered to maintain as 
many common users as possible to reduce the cost. 
The performance evaluation and cost analysis indicate 
that our framework can reduce the cost factor and gain 
good performance. With roadside unit server 
assistance, the proposed model can perform reliably. 
(5) The road side unit can immediately decide 
which messages are trustworthy, and then send its 
opinion to neighbouring vehicles immediately. With 
the aid of road side unit server, vehicles can 
successfully increase decision accuracy while making 
decisions about the event messages. 
(6) The evaluation experiments based on NS-3 
[18] to improve user’s authenticated key establishment 
protocol , that have relatively shorter response time, 
reduce cost, less packet lost information and enhanced 
privacy preservation as compared with  the proposed 
methods in [19] and [20]. 
    Memon et al. [4] presented secure and effective 
Communication design with authenticated key 
establishment protocol for road networks. This 
proposed scheme is based on Mix-zone server (MZs) 
protocol and have achieved address configuration for 
users over the road network. Moreover, this scheme 
has achieved user communication security via 
authentication kind of road network. Considering 
some of these features; this work is totally different 
from our previous work [4] in terms of following 
aspects: 
    The system architectures are unlike our previous 
work. A road network is a special type of vehicular 
network, when a vehicle enters a new IP domain; its 
network prefix correspondingly changes. Therefore, 
the architecture in this scheme is based on multiple IP 
dynamics mix-zone server. In our previous work, a 
road network is limited to one IP domain, so the 
network prefix of a mobile node keeps unchanged. 
The previous work based upon One IP domain. 
    The IPV6 address structure has changed. In this 
scheme, the network architecture is based on road 
segments and various junction concepts. In order to 
improve the performance and contribute to the 
hierarchical routing which is made up of RS ID and 
node ID. In previous work, the network architecture is 
based on the MIX-ZONE SERVER tree topology 
where a gateway node is the root. Correspondingly, an 
address consists of three parts that might be the global 
routing prefix, the gateway node ID and the node ID. 
This protocol simultaneously achieves the address 
configuration and address reclamation at the same 
time, therefore the extra cost and delay caused by the 
address reclamation is avoided.  
2. Address configuration protocol 
2.1. Protocol’s Structure 
 
 
The road network consists of mobile vehicles and RSU (road side unit) in this protocol [19-26] 
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communicating with Mix-zone server Internet over 
road side unit is shown in Fig. 1. 
 
 
 
  
 
Fig. 1. Road network architecture. 
 
 
2.2. Address Structure and address configuration 
algorithm 
The address structure for road network based on 
the proposed architecture is presented in Table 1 
and Table 2. 
Table. 1 IPv6 address structure 
 
 
 
Table. 2 Notations 
 
2.2.1 Registration state 
In registration state, as the user 
iU wants to 
register with the
sMZ , it performs two steps with sMZ . 
Step:1 ( ) ()( )i sU MZ : IDi,h PWi ,h® ×  
The user
iU  after freely choosing its password ipw   
and identity 
iID performs an iris scan with a capture 
and generates a template 
sMZ  that describes the iris 
template of
iU . . This protocol adopts iris as a 
characteristic since it is harder to be compromised in 
contrast to their characteristic information such as 
fingerprint.  Then, the user 
iU selects a secure one-
way hash function 0 1 0 1* kh( ) :{ , } { , }× ®  and calculates 
( ) h pwi , then it submits ( ) (){ }  ID, ST , h pwi ,h ×  to the sMZ  
through a secure channel. 
Step:2 ( ) ()( )s i i iMZ U U : ID ,h PW ,® ×  
      
After getting the information from the user
iU , sMZ  
calculates the secret information and encrypts
iID and 
ST via the server’s secret key s to attain ( )sT E ID ST= P  . 
Then, it conveys this smart card to the user Ui in a safe 
method in fig.2. The user 
iU preserves the 
password
ipw , the identity ID and the smart card 
confidentially for the authentication manner Case 1. 
Logging in for the first time, as shown in Fig.3 and 
Fig.4. Case 2. On a following login, as shown in Fig.5 
and Fig.6. 
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2.2.2. First time login state 
Step:1 
( ) ( )1 2rj rjQj T x mod p, Qj T Q mod p,= =  
( ) ( )1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2Y  h Qj , Y h Qj Q ||j Qi Y X Bj .= = P P P P  
   
Step:2 { }1 1 2 1 1 2sMZ RSUj Qi  X , X , Qj , Y , Y®  
 { } ( )1 1 2 1 1 2sMZ sends Qi ,X ,X , Qj ,Y ,Y  to the RSUj RSUj .®  
 
2.2.3. First-time login Authentication and key 
agreement state 
Step:1 { }1 1 2 1 1 2Qi , X , X , Qj , Y , Y ,  
   
The
sMZ  computes 
 
( ) ( ) ( )12 2 1r iQi * T Q mod p,IDi*  h Qi * X , Ai* h IDi , |* r|º = =Å  
( ) ( ) ( )12 2 1r jQj * T Q mod p,RSUIDj*  h Qj * , Bj* h RSUIDj* , Yº = =Å  
 
Step 2:  
The 
sMZ  checks if 
 
 
( ) ( )2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2X h Ai* RSUIDj Qi Qi * X ,Y h Qj Qj * Qi Y X Bj*|| .= =P P P P P P P P  
( ) ( )1 1 2 1 1Zi h Qi Qj RSUIDj* Ai* X ,Zj h Bj* Qi Qj Z|| i .= =P P P P P P  
 
Step:3 { }sMZ RSUj :  Zi, Zj®  
  
Step:4 { }1s RSUj  MZ :  Qj ,Rj, CIDi,t,R®  
 
Step:5 
The smart card first computes: 
 ( )1 1 2Zi* h Qi Qj RSUIDj Ai X= P P P P  
and checks whether 
 1ir j( ||T (QRj h Zi* CIDi t) )R= P P P  
 
( )11 1 ir j( T (QRi h RSUIDj Qi Qj V d h RSUIDj pwi), I i t|D | V= = ÅP P P P P P
 
 and stores 
 { }RSUIDj,d ,CIDi,t  
 ( )( )1ir jTSK h RSUIDjQ= P  
   
 
 
Fig. 2. Registration state. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. First time login state. 
 
Step:7 { }i s sU MZ : MZ®  
The card sends 
 s{ MZ }  to the RSUj . 
Step:8 ( )( )11 1 jr iRi h RUSIDj Qi Qj h C || ||T (Q )IDi Bj t= P P P P  
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Fig. 4. First-time login Authentication and key agreement state 
 
 
Fig. 5. Consequent login state 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Consequent login Authentication and key agreement state 
2.2.4. Consequent login Authentication and 
key agreement state 
Step 1. On the reception of request message 
{ }1 2i sCID ,t,X ,X ,MZ   primarily checks if t is valid. Then, 
if it is valid, 
sMZ computes ( )1 1
*
i i j|Q h | ||CID B t XÅ= . 
Then jRSU  checks whether 
 2 1 1
*
i j iX h CID RSUI( || || |D Q | X .)=  
Step:2 ( )( )1 1 1 1j
*
j i i jr jT ( x ) ||Q  modp,Y h Q h CID B|| || t Q ,Åº =
 
 ( )2 1 11 1 j
*
j i i j r i( || || || || || ||TY h Q Q (Qh CID B t Y .))=  
Step:3 { }1 2sj i MZ iRSU  :  Y ,Y®  
Step:4 The smart card initially calculates 
 ( )( )1 1 1* *j i i jQ h Q h C|| || |ID B |t YÅ=   
and checks whether 
 ( )2 1 1 11 i
* *
r jj i i j( || || || || || |Y h Q Q h |T (CID B Qt Y ))=  
If case of above equality, the smart card 
calculates 1ir jV R T (Q )= Å , 
 ( )1 1 1 1ii j
*
i j i j r j( Q Q * h CIR h RSUI D B t Y T (Q ))D .= P P P P P P P  
Lastly, the card calculates the session key  
 ( )1i
*
jr jSK h T (Q ) )RSUID= P  
Step:5 { }j is RSUMZ :  R®  
Step: 6 the service 
sMZ  checks whether the 
equality holds 
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 ( )( )1 1 11 1 j ji j i i jj r i r i|| Q || || || T (R h RSUID Q h CID B t Y Q )T (Q )= P P P  
2.2.5. Password Change Phase 
Then the smart card computes 
 ( )1 1 2
new new new new
i i i i i id d h pw ID h pw ID ,d h I( | D| ) ( || ) || pwÅ= Å =  
 and replaces  
 { }1 2d ,d with { }1 2
new newd ,d .  
 
3. Security Analysis 
This protocol restrains the malicious attacks 
associated to the dynamic address configuration and 
hold the security. 
3.1. Address forgery Attack 
Using this protocol, a mobile vehicle attains a 
unique address with no replicate address detection. If 
any malicious mobile vehicle takeoffs the address of a 
real mobile vehicle to spread a wrong message (for 
instance, a replicate location detection message), 
firstly the message will be delivered to its nearby 
mobile vehicles. As the malicious mobile vehicle is 
not authenticated by the nearby vehicles, they reject 
the wrong message. Hence, the wrong message is 
restricted. Similarly, if a malicious mobile vehicle try 
to interact with a real mobile vehicle by taking an 
address, then the real mobile vehicle will obstruct the 
interaction with that vehicle since the malicious 
mobile vehicle is not authenticated [20]. 
 
3.2. Address Exhaustion Attack 
When a malicious mobile vehicle request for an 
address from a nearby mobile vehicle or roadside, its 
request is declined as the malicious mobile vehicle or 
roadside is not authenticated. 
 
3.2.1. Fake address conflict attack 
If an address conflict message is broadcasted by 
any malicious mobile vehicle, then this message is 
firstly received by the nearby mobile vehicles and they 
abandon this address conflict message as they cannot 
authenticate the malicious mobile vehicle. 
Furthermore, this protocol gains the address 
configuration with no replicate address detection, so to 
certify an assigned address’ distinctiveness, it does not 
apply an address conflict message. So, this could be 
easily authenticated by any mobile vehicle that the 
received address conflict message is from a malicious 
mobile vehicle. Hence the streaming of a fake address 
message is avoided. 
3.2.2. Replay Attack 
 
When a good vehicle X, sends an encrypted 
address request message, a malicious node interrupts it 
and again sends the same message to a vehicle Y to 
ask for an address to exhaust the address resources and 
occupy network resources. After Y receives the 
encrypted address request message, it can abandon 
this message as in this message the time stamp is 
expired. A malicious node interrupts the encrypted 
address response message from a good vehicle Y and 
again sends the same encrypted address response 
message to another node X and causes the address 
conflict. When X receives this encrypted address 
response message, it can discard this message because 
it cannot decrypt the encrypted address response 
message through its secret key. Hence, the replay 
attack is prevented. 
4. Performance Evaluation  
The previous methods [19, 21-26] are designated 
to make a comparison with our method because of the 
following reasons in Table 3, Table 4 and  
 
Table 3.Compare reasons  
 
 
Table 4.Efficiency comparisons of our scheme and the other related 
schemes [19, 22] 
 
 
We have given a brief comparison of our scheme 
and the other prevailing schemes in terms of 
performance metrics which are important in road 
network authentication protocol, i.e., Authorization 
phase, Access service phase, computational cost, and 
computational time as shown (Table 4). In our 
experiments, to simulate a practical situation, the 
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mobile vehicle are installed on two PCs in a local area 
network. In the registration phase, the presented 
scheme needs one hash operation to calculate 
d0=h(pwi||IDi) N on user side, needs one road side 
unit point multiplication operation and one modular 
inversion operation to obtain d1=c N, d2=h(IDi||pwi), 
and needs one symmetric encryption operation to 
calculates Ai=h(IDi||r), c=Ai d0  on the road side unit. 
While in authentication phase user side requires four 
scalar point multiplication operations to compute 
Vrh(PW)P and W=rR; three hash operations to 
calculate h(ST) , u Auth and SK; one symmetric 
encryption operation to find Z and one symmetric 
decryption operation to decrypt message Auths. The 
MIX-ZONE SERVER requires two symmetric 
decryption operations to decrypt message {Ri} and [1], 
one symmetric encryption operation to calculate Auths; 
one elliptic curve scalar point multiplication 
operations to calculate V; and two hash operations to 
get Authu and SK. Thus, the whole execution time of 
the computational time (s) is calculated as 4.35. As an 
evident of Table 4, our protocol has outperformed 
other protocols. It is renowned evidence that the 
symmetric encryption/decryption operation and the 
hash function operation hold the same computational 
cost. Consequently, the Computational cost of our 
proposed protocol, regarding the hash function 
operations, is more efficient as compared to other 
protocols. 
5. Conclusion and Future work 
In this paper, we put forward an Improved User’s 
Authenticated Key Establishment Protocol for Road 
Networks. We establish a privacy preserving 
authentication protocol to verify the vehicle activities 
in a privacy preserving manner. We proposed a new 
method to adjust the vehicles speed which reduces the 
vehicle delay which might suffers from the network 
gap problem. We proposed a novel vehicle orientated 
privacy preserving technique for road network 
services that is also proficient of protecting the Road 
side unit from attacks. The road side unit can 
immediately decide which messages are trustworthy, 
and then send its opinion to neighbouring vehicles 
immediately. With the aid of road side unit server, 
vehicles can successfully increase decision accuracy 
while making decisions about the event messages. 
The evaluation experiments based on NS-3 [18] 
to improve user’s authenticated key establishment 
protocol have proved that our protocol has 
comparatively shorter response time, diminish cost, 
less packet lost information and better privacy 
preservation as related to those proposed in [19] and 
[20]. 
In future work, we will propose authentication with 
handover process using IPV6 protocol for 4G LTE 
cellular networks to reduce the computational cost, 
faster process, less steps (it is implementable with 
IPv6 protocol probably the quickest way is a listing of 
command, it will shows crypto) scheme by the future 
proposed scheme, the overall system complexity is 
able to be reduced. 
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